We introduce a decentralized trust management model called anonymous role-based cascaded delegation. In this model, a delegator can issue authorizations on behalf of her role without revealing her identity. This type of delegation protects the sensitive membership information of a delegator and hides the internal structure of an organization. To provide an efficient storage and transmission mechanism for credentials used in anonymous role-based cascaded delegation, we present a new signature scheme that supports both signer anonymity and signature aggregation. Our scheme has compact role signatures that make it especially suitable for ubiquitous computing environments, where users may have mobile computing devices with narrow communication bandwidth and small storage units.
I. Introduction
Authorization is an important concept of the resource sharing in open and collaborative environments such as Grid systems or the Internet. In role-based trust management [21] , [26] , privileges are associated with roles and each user is assigned one or more roles. Role members prove their memberships with public keys and digital credentials. Role-based delegation is important in decentralized role-based trust management for transferring privileges and sharing resources among role members that are initially unknown to each other. A delegation credential is a digital certificate signed by a delegator on a statement that gives authorizations to delegatees. In role-based delegation models [22] , [26] , a member E of role r is allowed to delegate privileges associated with r to other roles by issuing delegation credentials. In order to delegate, the member E has to show his role membership by revealing his role credential.
For example, in a collaborative environment, hospital H delegates its role guest to the role consultant at company P in a credential C. John is a member of the role consultant at company P and has the corresponding role credential R. John may further delegate the role guest at H to the role professor at university U in a credential C . Credentials C, R, and C constitute the delegation credential for the role professor at U , and prove the validity of the authorzation.
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Computer Science Department, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, {dyao, rt}@cs.brown.edu For privacy concerns, the identity of a user or an authorizer may be sensitive information in e-commerce, emedicine, or peer-to-peer file-sharing (e.g., Kazaa) applications. An authorizor may not want to reveal his or her identity and role membership at each authorization or authentication. In addition, organizations may want to hide their internal structures from the outside world.
To address these privacy concerns, an anonymous rolebased delegation protocol can be implemented with group signatures, in which a signature proves the membership of a signer without revealing the identity [17] . The anonymous signing feature of group signatures is particularly suitable for role-based delegation, because what is essential to verifying a delegation credential is the proof of the delegator's role membership, rather than the identity. A rolebased delegation protocol implemented using group signature schemes is not only scalable due to the use of roles, but also has strong privacy protection provided by the group signature schemes.
A practical concern about group signatures is their efficiency in a distributed environment. Next, we introduce the technique of aggregate signatures and explain the need for a signature scheme that supports both anonymous signing and signature aggregation.
A. Credential size and aggregate signatures
Lengthy digital credentials are inefficient to transmit and store. In decentralized trust management systems [22] , [26] , a delegation chain represents how trust or a delegated privilege is transferred from one user to another. The chain contains a sequence of delegation credentials that connects unknown entities and resource owners. The number of credentials required to authenticate a delegation chain is linear in the length of the chain. Credentials associated with a delegation chain need to be compact, because mobile devices may have limited storage units and bandwidth.
Aggregate signatures [9] , [23] are an effective solution for shortening credential size. Namely, multiple signatures on different messages can be aggregated into one signature of constant size. An interesting question is how to obtain an aggregate signature scheme that supports anonymous signing in role-based authorization. Desirable properties of such a signature scheme include anonymity, unlinkability, and revocability, and aggregation. In on-line banking applications for example, certain transaction can be approved Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Workshop on Information Assurance United States Military Academy, West Point, NY only if it is signed sequentially by a member of the role cashier, a member of the role accountant, and a member of the role manager. Each signature can be generated without disclosing the signer's identity for privacy protection, and then be aggregated to existing ones.
In this paper, we present an anonymous-signer aggregate signature scheme that supports both anonymity and aggregation by designing a special kind of cryptographic key pair. The unique feature of the key is that it contains the identity information of a role member, yet it is unlinkable. In other words, the seemingly random key used for signing cannot be forged by a role manager, as it contains the long term secret key of a role member, which is not known to the manager. We are able to achieve this by leveraging properties of a bilinear map, which was first used in the identity-based encryption scheme of Boneh and Franklin [8] .
In the following, we briefly introduce the role-based cascaded delegation (RBCD) protocol [26] , [28] . RBCD protocol is extended in this paper to support anonymity using the anonymous-signer aggregate signature scheme.
B. Role-based cascaded delegation
A large amount of work has been done on trust management and distributed authorization systems [1] , [3] , [6] , [19] , [21] . Among them, role-based cascaded delegation [26] is an efficient role-based trust management model that supports administrator-free delegation. Administrator-free delegation allows an individual role member to issue delegations without the participation of a role administrator. It enables flexible and dynamic authorization in a decentralized environment. It comprises four operations: Initiate, Extend, Prove, and Verify. Initiate and Extend are used by a resource owner and an intermediate delegator, respectively, to delegate a privilege to a role. Prove is used by a requester to produce a proof of a delegation chain that connects the resource owner with the requester. Verify decides whether the requester is granted the access based on the proof.
In RBCD [26] , a delegation credential includes role membership certificates of each intermediate delegator, and delegation extension credentials that are proofs of delegation transactions signed by delegators. Credentials associated with a delegation chain are transmitted to delegated role members at each delegation transaction. Therefore, for a delegation chain of length n, the number of certificates required to verify the delegation path is 2n. In this paper, we use our signature scheme to extend the original RBCD protocol to support the anonymity of delegators. The contributions of this paper are summarized next.
C. Our contributions
We present an anonymous-signer aggregate signature scheme. We introduce a key blinding mechanism that integrates the long-term private key of a signer with a random blinding factor. Using this special signing key, a role member cannot deny a signature when revoked anonymity; yet, the role manager cannot misattribute a signature to any role member. By leveraging signature aggregation [9] , the length of a role signature can be as short as 170 bits with security equivalent to a 1024-bit RSA signature. A role signature along with the public information needed for verification is only 510 bits or 64 bytes long. Role members can join and leave at any time, without requiring existing members to perform any update.
In an anonymous-signer aggregate signature scheme, individual role signatures that may be generated by members of different roles can be aggregated into one signature of constant length. Even if a signature is aggregated with other signatures, a role manager can trace the signer by showing a proof. The security is based on the security of the aggregate signature scheme [9] . Because of one-time public keys, the asymptotic growth of our signatures is still linear in the number of individual signatures. Nevertheless, signature aggregation can significantly reduce the length of multiple signatures. A discussion on the efficiency of the scheme is given in Section V.
We describe how anonymous-signer aggregate signatures can be used to realize an anonymous and efficient rolebased authorization protocol, where a delegator issues delegation credentials and proves role membership without disclosing the identity. Although anonymous RBCD can be realized with any group signature scheme, using our anonymous-signer aggregate signature scheme allows the compression of delegation credentials and significantly improves the efficiency. Delegation certificates in RBCD are issued to roles, rather than individual role members. For example, a privilege is delegated to the role doctor at a hospital.
Note that the RBCD protocol does not require a hierarchical generalization of our signature scheme, and does not require the (expensive) hierarchical certification of onetime signing keys.
Finally, we point out that anonymous role-based delegation implemented with anonymous-signer aggregate signatures gives rise to a proxy signature scheme for groups, which may be of separate interest. In this scheme, an original signer E serves as a delegator, and delegates the signing power to a certain group G of proxy signers by issuing a delegation certificate. Each of the proxy signers can sign anonymously on behalf of E, provided that the proxy is a valid group member. The anonymity can be revoked by the manager of group G. The signature from a proxy signer needs to demonstrate the group membership of the proxy, and that group G is authorized by the original signer. We omit the details of our proxy signature scheme for groups in this paper, as it can be easily derived from our anonymous RBCD protocol.
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D. Outline of the paper
In Section II, we give an overview of the aggregate signature scheme by Boneh et al. [9] . The definition and construction of our anonymous-signer aggregate signature scheme are given in Section III. In Section IV, we introduce the anonymous role-based cascaded delegation protocol. The analysis of the anonymous role-based cascaded delegation protocol is given in Section V. Related work is described in Section VI.
II. Preliminaries
Here, we describe the aggregate signature scheme [9] that is used to construct our signature schemes. The aggregate signature scheme by Boneh, Gentry, Lynn, and Shacham (BGLS scheme for short) supports aggregation of multiple signatures on distinct messages from distinct users into one signature [9] . It uses bilinear maps [8] and works in any group where the decision Diffie-Hellman problem (DDH) is easy, but the computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH) is hard. Such groups are referred as gap groups [25] and are explained further in Section III-A. The aggregate signature scheme comprises five algorithms: KeyGen, Signing, Verification, Aggregation, and Aggregate Verification. The first three algorithms are defined the same as in ordinary signature schemes; Aggregation merges multiple signatures into one signature of constant length; Aggregate Verification verifies aggregate signatures. Informally, the security of aggregate signature schemes is equivalent to the nonexistence of an adversary capable of existentially forging an aggregate signature [9] . Here, existential forgery means that the adversary attempts to forge an aggregate signature by some set of users, on messages of her choice. The formal proof of security defines an aggregate chosen-key security model, where the adversary is given a single public key, and her goal is the existential forgery of an aggregate signature. The adversary is given the power to choose all public keys except the challenge public key, and she is also given access to a signing oracle on the challenge key [9] . We refer readers to the paper of BGLS scheme [9] for further details.
Our anonymous-signer aggregate signature scheme is constructed based on the aggregate signature scheme [9] . We do not claim our scheme as a general group signature scheme, although it has the key properties of a group signature scheme. To distinguish from the naming conventions of group signatures, we use role, role member, role manager, and role signature in our scheme, which are equivalent to group, group member, group manager, and group signature in a group signature scheme, respectively. A role represents a number of individuals having certain attributes, each of them being a role member. The role is administrated by the role manager. A role signature is a signature signed by a role member on behalf of a role.
III. Anonymous-signer aggregate signature scheme
We present our anonymous-signer aggregate signature scheme. First, we list the number theoretic assumptions needed in our scheme, and then describe the algorithms.
A. Assumptions
Similar to the aggregate signature scheme [9] , our anonymous-signer aggregate signature scheme uses bilinear maps and works in gap groups [10] , [25] , which is explained next. Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic groups of some large prime order q. We write G 1 additively and G 2 multiplicatively. Computation Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem: Given a randomly chosen P ∈ G 1 , aP , and bP (for unknown randomly chosen a, b ∈ Z q ), compute abP . Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Problem: Given a randomly chosen P ∈ G 1 , aP, bP , and cP (for unknown randomly chosen a, b, c ∈ Z q ), decide whether c = ab. (If so, (P, aP, bP, cP ) is called a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple.)
We call G 1 a gap group, if the DDH problem can be solved in polynomial time but no probabilistic algorithm can solve the CDH problem with non-negligible advantage within polynomial time. As observed in the aggregate signature scheme [9] , general gap groups are insufficient for constructing efficient aggregate signatures, therefore our scheme also makes use of bilinear maps. We refer the readers to papers by Boneh and Franklin [8] for examples and discussions of groups that admit such pairings. Admissible pairings: Following Boneh and Franklin [8] , we callê an admissible pairing ifê : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is a map with the following properties: bilinear:ê(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q) ab for all P, Q ∈ G 1 and all a, b ∈ Z; non-degenerate: the map does not send all pairs in G 1 ×G 1 to the identity in G 2 ; computable: there is an efficient algorithm to computê e(P, Q) for any P, Q ∈ G 1 .
B. Definitions
An anonymous-signer aggregate signature scheme consists of Setup, Join, Sign, Aggregate, Verify, and Open algorithms.
Setup: On input a security parameter k, a probabilistic algorithm outputs the initial group public key Y. Each entity (role manager and role member) also chooses his or her public/private keys. Join: A protocol between the role manager and a user that results in the user becoming a new role member. The output of the user is membership certificates and membership secrets. Aggregate: This deterministic algorithm takes as inputs a number of role signatures and returns one aggregate signature. Sign: An algorithm that on input a role public key, a membership secret, a membership certificate, and a message M Verify: An algorithm takes as inputs the role public key Y, the role signature Sig, and the message M . The output is 1 or 0. Open: The deterministic algorithm takes as inputs the message M , the signature Sig, and role manager's secret information to return the identity of the signer.
A secure anonymous-signer aggregate signature scheme must satisfy the following properties:
Correctness: Signatures produced by a role member using Sign must be accepted by Verify. Unforgeability: Only role members can sign messages on behalf of the role. In particular, for an anonymous-signer aggregate signature S that is aggregated from n individual role signatures, even if an adversary knows n − 1 of them, she cannot successfully forge S. Anonymity: Given a valid signature, it is computationally hard to identify the signer for anyone except the role manager. Unlinkability: Deciding whether two different valid signatures were computed by the same role member is computationally hard for anyone except the role manager. Traceability: The role manager is always able to open a valid signature and identify the signer. Exculpability: Even if the role manager and members collude, they cannot sign on behalf of a non-involved member. Coalition-resistance: A colluding subset of role members cannot produce a valid signature that the role manager cannot open. Aggregation: Multiple signatures signed on different messages by different signers can be aggregated into one signature of constant length, and the aggregation can be performed by anyone.
C. Construction
A naive anonymous-signer aggregate signature scheme can be developed based on one-time keys and aggregate signature scheme. However, such a scheme does not satisfy the exculpability requirement. We overcome this problem by designing signing keys that are both unlikable and tied to the long-term private key of a signer. Although this sounds like an oxymoron, we are able to achieve this and prove all of the required properties of the signature scheme.
The construction of our signature scheme is based on the pairing-based aggregate signature scheme [9] and the group signature scheme by Chen et al. [18] . It comprises six algorithms: Setup, Join, Sign, Aggregate, Verify, and Open. The Signing, Verification, and Aggregate Verification algorithms of BGLS scheme [9] are used in our scheme. The notation of our anonymous-signer aggregate signature scheme is shown in Table I . The last three items in Table I refer to the k-th signature in an (aggregate) signature aggregated from n (k ≤ n) individual signatures. 
Setup: This operation outputs the system parameters and public/private keys of users that will be used in the system.
• The root of system chooses a set of public parameters params = (G 1 , G 2 ,ê, π, H), where G 1 , G 2 are groups of a large prime order q, G 1 is a gap group,ê : G 1 ×G 1 → G 2 is a bilinear map, π is a generator of G 1 , and H : {0, 1} * → G 1 is a collision-resistant hash function, viewed as a random oracle.
• Each role member chooses a secret s u as his private key, and computes the product s u π as its public key P u . Similarly, the role manager chooses his secret key s A , and computes the public key P A = s A π. These are the long-term public keys, and are certified by a Certificate Authority (CA) using any signature scheme. The public key certificate of a member is used for repudiating misattributed signatures, and is different from the one-time signing permits below. Join: A role member E obtains one or more one-time signing permits from the role manager. The permits certify E's one-time signing key information, and are used for issuing role signatures. The following shows how the signing permits are generated.
• E randomly chooses a number of secrets x 1 , . . . , x l , and computes one-time signing factors X u,1 = x 1 π, . . . , X u,l = x l π and one-time signing public keys K u,1 = s u x 1 π, . . . , K u,l = s u x l π. Keys P u , X u,i , and K u,i are sent to the role manager, for all i ∈ [1, l]. E also sends Cert to the role manager.
• The role manager tests if e(K u,i , π) = e(P u , X u,i ) for all i ∈ [1, l]. Recall K u,i = s u x i π, P u = s u π, and X u,i = x i π. If the test fails, the protocol terminates. Otherwise, the role manager runs algorithm Signing of BGLS scheme on inputs s A and strings roleinfo K u,i to obtain S u,i = s A H(roleinfo K u,i ) for all i ∈ [1, l]. S u,i is the i-th onetime signing permit for E, and is given to E. The role manager adds tuples (P u , X u,i , K u,i ) to its record for all i ∈ [1, l]. Signing of BGLS scheme [9] on inputs s u x i and M , where s u x i is one of his one-time signing secrets. Then, E calls algorithm Aggregation of BGLS scheme to merge signature S u with his one-time signing permit S u,i associated with the secret s u x i . This gives the role signature, which is returned with the public key P A of the role manager and the key K u,i . The details are as follows.
• E runs algorithm Signing of BGLS scheme with secret key s u x i and message M , and obtains a signature S u = s u x i H(M ).
• E aggregates the signature S u with one-time signing permit S u,i associated with secret s u x i . This is done by running Aggregation of BGLS scheme, which returns a signature S g = S u +S u,i . Recall that S u,i = s A H(roleinfo K u,i ). S g is output as the role signature. E also outputs public key P A and one-time signing public key K u,i . Aggregate: Same as in algorithm Aggregation in the BGLS scheme [9] . It takes as inputs n number of role signatures S g k and corresponding values P A k and
Agg is output as the anonymous-signer aggregate signature. The associated keys
Note that k-th role manager's public key P A k for k ∈ [1, n] does not need to be the same. In other words, signatures from roles of different organizations can be aggregated. Verify: This algorithm calls algorithm Aggregate Verification of BGLS scheme [9] with the following inputs: an anonymous-signer aggregate signature S Agg , public key P A k , and one-time signing public key K u k ,i k for all k ∈ [1, n].
• For 1 ≤ k ≤ n, compute the hash digest H(M k ) of message M k and h k = H(roleinfo k K u k ,i k ) of the statement on one-time signing permit.
The correctness of the verification is shown in the full version of this paper [27] .
Open: Given an anonymous-signer aggregate signature S Agg and its associated public information including P A k and K u k ,i k for k ∈ [1, n], a role manager first verifies signature S Agg . If it is valid, a role manager can easily identify a role member's public key P u k from K u k ,i k , by consulting the role record. The role member cannot deny his signature because the role manager can provide a proof (i.e. by showingê(K u k ,i k , π) =ê(P u k , X u k ,i k )) that the signature is associated with the member's public key. The exculpability requirement is satisfied. Intuitively, this is because (1) long-term public keys are certified by CA, (2) signing keys are computed from long-term private keys, and (3) forging a valid signature with a correctly formed signing key is hard. Due to the page limit, the proof for Theorem 4 is omitted and can be found in the full version [27] of this paper [27] .
Theorem 1:
The communication complexity of Join algorithm is O(l), where l is the number of one-time signing keys certified. The computation complexity of Verify algorithm is O(n), where n is the number of signatures aggregated.
D. Security
Here we analyze the security of our anonymous-signer aggregate signature scheme. Adversarial model: In our scheme, a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary is allowed to do the following. (1) An adversary can intercept any signatures in both the aggregated and individual form; (2) an adversary can steal valid signing certificates of role members; and (3) an adversary can collude with the role manager and role members, and attempt to sign on behalf of a non-involving role member.
We analyze the security of our anonymous-signer aggregate signature scheme by proving the following three theorems. The first theorem states it is infeasible for an adversary to forge either a one-time signing permit or a role signature. The second theorem shows that in our signature scheme, a verifier can verify the membership of a signer without gaining any other knowledge about the signer. Finally, the last theorem shows that our signature scheme satisfies the properties listed in Section III-B.
Theorem 2: Our anonymous-signer aggregate signature scheme is as secure as the BGLS aggregate signature scheme against existential forgery attacks.
Theorem 3: A valid anonymous-signer aggregate signature in our scheme contains proofs of role memberships without revealing the identities of signers.
Theorem 4: Our anonymous-signer aggregate signature scheme from bilinear pairings in gap groups satisfies the following requirements: correctness, unforgeability, anonymity, unlinkability, traceability, coalition-resistance, and aggregation in the random oracle model under the CDH assumption.
Due to space limit, proofs of above theorems are omitted and can be found in the full version of this paper [27] .
IV. Anonymous role-based cascaded delegation protocol
We first define anonymous role-based cascaded delegation and then describe how it is realized using anonymoussigner aggregate signatures. Delegation credentials generated in our signature scheme are efficient to store and transmit, which is important in ubiquitous computing. Similar to definitions in the original RBCD protocol [26] , a privilege represents a role membership or a permission for an action such as accessing a database. Anonymous role-based cascaded delegation allows any role member to authorize
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A. Definitions
An anonymous role-based cascaded delegation protocol defines five operations: Initiate, Extend, Prove, Verify, and Open.
Initiate: Same as in RBCD protocol [26] , this operation is run by a resource owner to delegate a privilege to a role. It initiates a delegation chain for the privilege. The delegation certificate is signed using the private key of the resource owner on a statement, which includes the delegated privilege, the name of the role, and the public key of the role administrator. Extend: This operation is similar to Initiate, but is run by an intermediate delegator E, who is a member of a role that is delegated a privilege by credential C. The goal is to generate a credential C that extends the privilege to members of another role r. Delegation credential C includes information of the delegated privilege, the name of role r, and the public key of role r's administrator. In addition, credential C also contains the delegation credential C that E received, and the proof of E's role membership. C does not disclose the identity of E.
Credential C may simply be an accumulation of individual certificates. In comparison, our realization using anonymous-signer aggregate signatures is more efficient. Prove: A requester E with role r produces a proof, which authenticates the delegation chain connecting the resource owner with E. This includes a proof of E's role membership without disclosing the identity, and the delegation credential that delegates the requested privilege to r. Verify: This is performed by the resource owner to verify that a proof produced by a requester correctly authenticates the delegation chain of a privilege. Open: Role administrator revokes the anonymity of a delegator by examining signatures on a delegation credential. The identity of the delegator is returned.
B. Realization
We give an anonymous RBCD protocol using anonymous-signer aggregate signatures.
Compared to the original RBCD protocol [26] , a one-time signing secret key instead of the delegator's private key is used to sign a credential, and a one-time signing permit instead of a role credential is used to prove role membership.
Setup: Setup in anonymous-signer aggregate signature scheme is run to allow the root of system to set up public parameters params, and individuals to choose and certify long-term keys. Then, Join protocol is run between role members and the role administrator to set up one-time signing permits. The role administrator also keeps a record of signing key information.
Initiate: A resource owner runs the Signing algorithm of BGLS aggregate signature scheme [9] to sign a delegation credential that authorizes a certain privilege to a role.
Extend: To further delegate a privilege to a role r , a member E of role r first runs algorithm Sign of anonymoussigner aggregate signature scheme to sign a delegation statement. Inputs to algorithm Sign are params, E's onetime signing secret key s u x i , his one-time signing permit S i corresponding to s u x i , and a delegation statement. Sign returns a role signature Sig, and appends public signing key s u x i π to the delegation statement. Then, delegator E calls Aggregate of anonymous-signer aggregate signature with Sig and the signature on the delegation credential issued to role r. The resulting aggregate signature S Agg and delegation statements are returned to r as the delegation credential.
Prove: A requester E of role r first runs Sign algorithm of anonymous-signer aggregate signature, which uses a onetime signing key to sign a random message T chosen by verifier. Then, E calls Aggregate to merge the output signature with the signature on the delegation credential issued to role r. The outputs are returned.
Verify: Verify of anonymous-signer aggregate signature is run to verify the aggregate signatures submitted by the requester. The request is granted if the signature is accepted, and rejected if otherwise.
Open: A role administrator runs algorithm Open of anonymous-signer aggregate signature with a delegation credential, a target signing key s u x i π, and the signing keys record. This returns the public key s u π, which identifies the signer.
The security of the above protocol is directly based on the security of the anonymous-signer aggregate signature scheme. This implies that it is infeasible to forge any valid delegation credential even under collusion. The anonymous RBCD protocol satisfies traceability and exculpability requirements, i.e., a role administrator can revoke the anonymity of a role member as an intermediate delegator, but cannot frame a role member. Our realization of anonymous RBCD supports delegator anonymity without affecting the performance. It has similar efficiency as in the original RBCD protocol [26] . The time required for signing and verification is the same as in the original RBCD protocol [26] . In anonymous RBCD, role administrators need to sign multiple one-time signing permits for role members, which is not required in RBCD. Nevertheless, a single signature is quite fast (3.57 ms on a 1 GHz Pentium III, compared to 7.90 ms for a RSA signature with 1007-bit private key on the same machine [5] 
V. Analysis
We compare our anonymous-signer aggregate signature scheme with several existing group signature schemes in Table II . The strong Diffie-Hellman (DH) and DBDH problems are variants of the DH problem. In Table II , the length of a signature with security equivalent to a 1024-bit RSA signature, and does not include public keys and parameters. The length of ACJT signature is from the instance given in its paper [2] . Communications refer to the communication costs between a user and the manager to generate n grouprole signatures.
For a delegation chain of length n, a delegation credential using our anonymous-signer aggregate signatures can be twenty times shorter than the one using ACJT scheme [2] , and five times shorter than the one generated in BBS scheme [7] . For a delegation chain of length twenty, the size of our credential is 1.4 KB, and the one in BBS scheme is 5.2 KB; for a 20 Kbits per second connection, our credential can be transmitted within 0.5 seconds, and the one using BBS takes 2.1 seconds. Note that this improvement is significant for small mobile devices with limited communication bandwidth and storage unit. For example, smart cards with a microprocessor typically have 32 KB EEP-ROM storage. Since RBCD protocols are aimed to be used for resource sharing in dynamic and distributed collaboration environment, users with small computing devices are not unusual. Therefore, our approach has the advantage in storage and transmission efficiency. The calculation of credential sizes is omitted.
In the anonymous RBCD protocol, a delegation credential generated by Initiate operation contains a signature, delegator's public key, delegatee's role, the public key of delegatee's role administrator, and the delegated privilege. Similarly, we can derive the contents of a delegation credential after n − 1 extensions. Assume a role or privilege name is expressed in 100 bits and let security requirement equivalent to 1024-bit RSA signature. Using ACJT group signatures, the size of a credential of length n is at least 10944n bits. Using BBS group signatures, the size is 2073n bits. Using our signature scheme, the size is 540n + 170. The improvement in credential size is more significant as the length of delegation chain increases.
One-time keys. A major drawback of our anonymoussigner aggregate signature scheme is that signing keys and signing permits are not reusable. To reduce communications between the role manager and members, role members can obtain multiple signing permits S 1 , . . . , S n at a time, by asking the role manager to certify multiple signing keys K u,1 , . . . , K u,n . Similar concepts can be found in the trustee tokens scheme [20] and the secret handshakes protocol [4] . A role manager needs to keep a file for storing one-time signing public keys. However, this does not significantly affect his performance, even though the number of role members is large. For example, for a role that has 100,000 members who obtain 100 one-time signing keys each year for ten years, the total storage space for all the one-time signing keys takes about 6.4 GB and can be easily stored on hard disks. Although file I/O in general can be relatively slow, appending new keys to the file is done off-line and does not affect the performance of users. If a database is used to maintain the keys, operations such as searching a signing key can be very fast as the keys can be indexed. Remark: Our anonymous RBCD protocol does not use the anonymous-signer aggregate signatures in a hierarchical fashion, where a role member in one organization is the role manager of another organization and so on. Instead, signatures to be aggregated are generated by role members belonging to independent roles (or organizations), and role members have their signing keys certified independently by their role managers.
VI. Related Work
Our signature scheme has properties that are related to group signature schemes. Group signatures, introduced by Chaum and van Heijst [17] , allow members of a group to sign messages anonymously on behalf of the group. Only a designated group manager is able to identify the group member who issued a given signature. Furthermore, it is computational hard to decide whether two different signatures are issued by the same member. In early group signature schemes [17] , group public keys grew with the size of the group and were inefficient.
A group signature scheme with constant-sized public [14] , and followed by a number of improvements [2] , [7] . Until recently, group signature constructions (e.g., [2] , [12] ) were mostly based on the strong-RSA assumption, and a group signature typically comprised of multiple elements of RSA-signature length. Recently, bilinear pairing [8] has been used to construct group signature schemes [7] , [13] , [18] , whose security is based on variants of Diffie-Hellman assumptions. The group signature scheme by Boneh, Boyen, and Shacham [7] significantly shortens the signature length, compared to the RSAbased state-of-the-art group signature scheme by Ateniese et al. [2] . An identity-based group signature scheme was proposed by Chen, Zhang, and Kim [18] , where a group signature cannot be forged even if the private key of a user is known by a third party (i.e., the Private Key Generator in the ID-based systems [8] ).
Anonymous credential systems have been developed [11] , [15] , [16] to allow anonymous, yet authenticated and accountable, transactions between users and service providers. These systems give a technique for protecting the users' privacy when conducting Internet transactions. Our work presented in this paper is for anonymous role-based authorization, and can potentially be used as an anonymous credential system, where a user authenticates herself to be a valid member of a role. This can be achieved by generating a role signature, which is verified by a resource owner (verifier). The disadvantage of such an anonymous credential system compared to the state-ofthe-art is that the credential is only one-time use instead of multi-use.
